Great Salt Lake Minerals and Chemical Corporation v. Arthur G. McKee and Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
Great Salt Lake Minerals and Chemical
Corporation v. Arthur G. McKee and Company :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Merlin O Baker; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent.
Claron C Spencer; Senior and Senior; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant .
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Great Salt Lake Minerals v. McKee, No. 13858.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1042
ir 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS \ R E C E I V E D 
& CHEMICALS CORPORATION, J
 L A \ V LIBRARY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, J 
v. I AP^i ^o.l975 
ARTHUR G.McKEE& _ „ „ , 
COMPANY »G!IAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Reuben Clark Law School 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District Judge 
Claron C. Spencer 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appelkmt 
Merlin 0 . Baker 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKEft* 
400 Deseret Building | 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ,
 r M , f.,,.-, r 
v J A H 1 0 \ ^  / j 
Attorneys for Respondent 
C!arks Supreme 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Nature of the Case 1 
Disposition in the Lower Court 2 
Belief Sought on Appeal 2 
Statement of the Facts 2 
Argument 16 
I. McKee is liable to GSL in the amount of the 
performance bond which was required of 
Houben 16 
A. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement 
agent included the duty to see that 
Houben was bonded 16 
B. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement 
agent included the duty of prompt ac-
tion including notice with respect to the 
performance bond required of Houben.... 19 
C. GSL was damaged by McKee's failure 
to act promptly and is entitled to re-
cover from McKee the amount of the 
bond 23 
II . The trial court erred in concluding that GSL 
is barred by waiver or contributory negli-
gence or is estopped from recovering from 
McKee 26 
A. GSL did not waive its rights as against 
McKee with respect to the bond 26 
B. The defense of contributory negligence 
is not available to MeKee in this case .... 31 
C. This is not a case for the application of 
the doctrine of estoppel 35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
III. The trial court's findings of fact are con-
trary to the evidence 36 
A. It was error to fail to find that there 
was a contract of employment between 
GSL and McKee pursuant to which Mc-
Kee acted as GSL's agent in the pro-
curement of the conveyor system for 
GSL's process plants 36 
B. It was error to fail to find that McKee 
was the contracting party with Houben 
for the conveyor system and had all the 
powers reserved to McKee in its pur-
chase order including full authority to 
act in GSL's best interest with respect 
to the bonding of Houben 37 
C. It was error to find (Pdg. No. 6 (E, 
89)) that GSL assumed "the duty or 
obligation to inquire of Houben as to 
the status of the performance bond, to 
see that the bond was procured, to in-
quire of Houben or others as to Hou-
ben 's ability to provide said perform-
ance bond, or to advise GSL of these 
matters'7 37 
D. It was error to fail to find that had 
McKee acted promptly with respect to 
the bonding of Houben, a bond would 
have been issued and a surety company 
would have been obligated to GSL, to 
the extent of $300,000.00, for the com-
pletion of the conveyor system 39 
E. It was error to fail to find that McKee 
*sei/€n waited eight weeks after its purchase 
order to Houben was issued, at which 
time Houben no longer could obtain a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
bond, to contact Houben the first time 
about the bond, that McKee waited an-
other two weeks to telephone Houben a 
second time and then waited without 
taking further action with respect to the 
bonding of Houben 40 
F. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 8 (R, 
90)) that Mr. Derricott and Mr. Brink-
mann knew at all times that Houben had 
not obtained a bond 40 
G. It was error to fail to find that GSL 
expressed a continued intent that Hou-
ben be bonded 40 
H. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 9 (R. 
90)) that GSL knew or should have 
known on November 14 of Houben's 
financial difficulties and that Hou-
ben "probably" would not have been 
able to secure a bond at that time 41 
I. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 11 (R. 
90)) that shortly after Mr. Ferguson's 
telephone calls of November 6 and 20 fo 
Houben, the information was relayed A 
to GSL that Houben was still working 
on the bond and it was error to fail to 
find that McKee did not tell GSL that 
the bond was delayed and did not seek 
instructions of GSL when McKee 
learned of Houben's delay 41 
J It was error to find (Fdg. No. 12 (R. 
90)) that on November 14, when Mr. 
Parker telephoned GSL, his client then 
had an assignment from Houben, that 
lie asked GSL to agree to the terms of 
that assignment and that GSL did agree 42 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
K. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 13 (E, 
91)) that McKee's engineering and 
procurement services were terminated 
on January 2, 1970 42 
L. It was error to fail to find that no bene-
fit would have accrued to GrSL from re-
fusing to pay Houben after November 
1969 or in removing Houben from the job 42 
Conclusion „ 43 
CASES CITED 
Charlton v. Hackett, 
11 I7.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961) 36 
Coffey v. Polimeni, 188 F.2d 539 (1951) 22 
De Vas v. Noble, 
13 U.2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962) 36 
Larson v. Evans, 
12 U.2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088 (1961) 32 
(Martin v. Martin, 
29 U.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973) 36 
Migliaccio v. Davis, 
120 Ut, 1, 232 P.2d 195 (1951) 35 
Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Heath, 
90 Ut. 187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936) 28 
Ealph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan 
Ass'n, 94 Ut. 97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938) ., 43 
Schwab Safe & Lock Co. v. Snow, 
47 Ut. 199, 152 Pac. 171,176 (1915) 26 
State Automobile & Casualty Under, v. Salisbury, 
27 U.2d 229, 494 P.2d 529 (1972) 20, 25, 33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
Page 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
29 ALR2d 165, § 9, Duty and Liability of Insurance 
Broker as Agent to Insured with Respect to Pro-
curement, Continuance, Terms,, and Coverage of 
Insurance Policies 21, 25, 33 
22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, §§ 30, 32-33 34 
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 157 29 
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 158 29 
28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 159 27 
43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 175 21 
Couch On Insurance, vol. 2d, § 25:32 25 
Mecham, Outlines of Agency, § 500 19 
Mecham, Outlines of Agency, § 541 20 
Selections from Williston on Contracts, § 680 27 
Selections from Williston on Contracts, § 1293 18 
The Law of Torts, 4th ed., pp. 416-417. 420 32 
Williston On Contracts, § 1012 C, pp. 40-41 31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE MINERALS 
& CHEMICALS CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
ARTHUR G. McKEE & 
COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendwit-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff and appellant, Great 
Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corporation ("GSL"), 
against its agent, the defendant and respondent, Arthur 
G. McKee & Company ("McKee"), for damages in the 
sum of $300,000.00, which is the amount of the perform-
ance bond which McKee failed to see that its vendor ob-
tain as required in McKee's contract with the vendor for 
the design, fabrication and field erection of a conveyor 
system for the process plants which GSLi was construct-
ing. GSL proceeded under its first cause of action for 
breach of McKee's contractual obligations and alter-
natively under its second cause of action for liability in 
tort. (R. 2-4. y McKee answered denying liability with 
Record references are to the numbered pages of the record on 
appeal. 
1 
Appeal No. 
13858 
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respect to the bond and counterclaimed for the value of 
its services performed for GSL in 1970, for which it had 
not been paid. (B. 5-9.) GSL did not contest the counter-
claim. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court without a jury. 
Judgment was entered for McKee on GSL's claim and 
on McKee's counterclaim. (R, 96.) GSL's motion for a 
new trial (R. 97-99) was denied (R. 100) and this appeal 
followed (R. 101). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant GSL seeks the reversal of the district 
court's judgment as to GSL's claim and the entry of 
judgment in its favor. GSL does not challenge the judg-
ment so far as McKee's counterclaim is concerned. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In so far as possible, the material facts are presented 
in order as they developed in the dealings of the parties. 
In 1968, GSL was about to undertake the construc-
tion of process plants on the shores of the Great Salt 
Lake as part of its project for the recovery of minerals 
from the lake. GSL sought bids from several engineer-
contractor firms including McKee to perform the design 
and administrative engineering work for the project. 
(Tr. 7-9.)2 
2Transcript references are to the pages of the reporter's tran-
script of the testimony. 
Testimony of Harold J. Andrews, who was manager of engineer-
ing and construction and later president of GSL during the period of 
time involved in this action. (Tr. 6.) 
2 
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McKee is one of the four or five largest engineer-
contractor firms in the country. Such companies are con-
sidered as experts in their field and provide the full 
range of services including procurement and a knowledge 
of equipment and manufacturers and subcontractors. 
(Tr.65-68.)3 V 
McKee responded to GSL's request for bids, through 
its Western Knapp Engineering Division in San Fran-
cisco, by presenting alternative proposals in writing, one 
of which was a proposal that McKee would provide en-
gineering design and related services including, specific-
ally, procurement services which were described by 
McKee as including the following (Ex. 1-P) :4 
"1 . Assistance in equipment selection and bid 
evaluation; 
"2. Procurement, expediting and inspection as-
sistance as required by client;" 
McKee's proposal also included the following rep-
resentation in its cover letter (Ex. 1-P): 
"We assure you that we have the qualified 
personnel immediately available to initiate your 
program and carry it through in am expeditious 
manner to satisfactory completion and start-up." 
McKee's proposal for an engineering and procurement 
contract was accepted by GSL and they proceeded to 
3Testimony of Bernard Bernstrom, an experienced engineer and 
manager of the local office of Roberts & Shaeffer, a national engi-
neer-contractor firm. Mr. Bernstrom testified as an expert witness for 
GSL. (Tr. 62.) 
4Exhibit references are to the numbered exhibits received in evi-
dence at the trial. 
3 
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draft the agreement. (Ex. 6-P.) McKee's work was to 
include among other things, the development and staff-
ing of an organization to carry out all phases of the 
engineering work, and, as agent for GSL, the procure-
ment and delivery of all equipment and long lead-time 
materials. (Ex. 6-P, at pp. 2-3.) McKee was to provide 
the "standards of care, skill and diligence normally pro-
vided by a professional engineer in the performance of" 
its services. (Ex. 6-P, at p. 15.) 
On January 9,1969, GSL and McKee signed a "letter 
of intent" which stated their intent to execute the agree-
ment and authorized McKee to commence its services in 
accordance with the terms of the proposed contract. (Tr. 
13; Ex. 4-P.) Although the agreement was forwarded 
to McKee for execution in May, 1969 (Ex. 5-P), it was 
never signed (Tr. 27). McKee, however, advised GSL 
by letter in August, 1969, that McKee would continue to 
serve GSL on the same basis as before. (Ex. 7-P.) The 
unsigned agreement incorporated everything that was 
involved up to that time (Tr. 26) and both McKee?s as-
sistant general sales manager, Robert Hansen, and Mc-
Kee's project manager for its task force on the GSL pro-
ject, Harold McNeil, testified that the unsigned agree-
ment, together with the letter of intent, was considered 
by the parties as the equivalent of a contract (Tr. 147, 
150, 154, 274). McKee's billings to GSL made specific 
reference to the letter of intent in the following langu-
age (Ex. 52-D, at pp. 3, 5 and 6): 
"To charge your account for Engineering and 
Procurement Services for the design and con-
strttction of process plants at the Great Salt Lake 
4 
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site near Ogden, Utah, in accordance with the 
letter of intent dated January 9, 1969." 
McKee subsequently charged GSL (Tr. 154) and was 
paid for its services performed prior to January 26, 
1970, in accordance with the terms of the unsigned agree-
ment, approximately $1,000,000.00 (Tr. 16). 
It had been contemplated from the outset that some 
items needed for the process plants would be purchased 
as "contract packages" from contractors or "outside 
vendors" as discussed in McKee's proposal for its ser-
vices and in GSL's Design Criteria Package. (Ex. 1-P, 
at pp. 3-4; Ex. 3-P, at p. 2) Since there were many ven-
dors5 for the project and their certified drawings were 
needed before McKee's engineers could proceed accu-
rately with their final design of the project, Mr. Andrews 
and Mr. Brinkmann, GSL's manager of the project, testi-
fied that GSL offered the services of its purchasing 
agent, Mr. Fay Derricott, to speed up the process of 
getting the drawings. (Tr. 42, 54.) A meeting was held 
on August 20,1969, to "confirm the expediting procedure 
to secure the outstanding engineering information that 
is essential to the project schedule." According to Mc-
Kee's memorandum of the meeting, Mr. Derricott was 
to "perform the expediting, which is indicated in the 
minutes of weekly meetings and as supplemented by 
other communications from McKee Engineering." (Ex. 
27-P.) 
One of the items to be purchased from vendors was 
the conveyor system. (Tr. 12; Ex. 3-P, at p. 2) For such 
5McKee issued fifty purchase orders in the procurement work for 
the GSL project. (Tr. 181.) 
$ 
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purchases McKee's purchasing and construction depart-
ments maintained a "list of qualified and acceptable 
bidders." (Ex. 24-P, part P-3 at p. 3.) After the lowest 
bidder for the conveyor system, Coastal Plains, Inc., re-
fused to give certain warranties required by GrSL, the 
parties turned to the next lowest bidder, Houben Indus-
tries, Inc. ("Houben"). (Tr. 214-215.) McKee's analysis 
of the bids for the conveyor system stated that Houben 
had a fairly high degree of experience in the materials 
handling field but its experience, facilities and financial 
capabilities were inferior to those of Coastal Plains. 
(Ex. 8-P, at p. 2.) Mr. McNeil testified that McKee had 
made an investigation of Houben including its financial 
situation and had concluded that Houben was capable 
of supplying the conveyor system. (Tr. 275.) Houben 
was not known to GSL's project manager, Mr. Brink-
mann, who did not learn until later that Houben would 
have to subcontract the fabrication work for the con-
veyor system. (Tr. 236-237.) 
McKee gave Houben a "letter of intent" on August 
21, 1969, expressing McKee's intent to purchase from 
Houben the design, supply of materials, fabrication and 
field erection of the conveyor system and authorizing 
Houben to proceed immediately with engineering and 
design. (Ex. 9-P.) Mr. Andrews testified that CfSL had 
ordered that Houben be bonded (Tr. 102, 105), and Mc-
Kee, in its letter of intent, asked Houben the cost of 
furnishing a $300,000.00 performance bond (Ex. 9-P). 
Houben responded the following day by returning a 
signed copy of McKee's letter of intent and stating that 
the cost of a bond would be 1% or $3,000.00. (Ex. 10-P.) 
6 
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Later, on September 18, 1969, McKee sent its pur-
chase order for the conveyor system to Houben. (Ex. 
11-P.) According to the purchase order, the contract for 
the conveyor system was between McKee as the pur-
chaser and Houben as vendor while GrSL was referred 
to as the owner of the project, (Ex. 11-P, at p. 1.) The 
purchase order called for the design, supply of materials, 
fabrication and field erection of the conveyor system for 
a fixed price of $597,556.00. A performance bond in the 
amount of $300,000.00 was to be obtained by Houben. 
(Ex. 11-P, at p. 6.) McKee reserved the right to approve 
the form of the bond and the issuer. (Ex. 11-P, at p. 16.) 
The bond was not a condition precedent to Houben's 
commencement of its work, since McKee's letter of intent 
had directed Houben to "proceed immediately with en-
gineering and design" (Ex. 10-P), but Houben was re-
quired to furnish copies of the bond to McKee "without 
delay" (Ex. 11-P, at p. 5). The certificates for liability 
insurance, on the other hand, were to be obtained by 
Houben " prior to commencement of construction activi-
ties". (Ex. 11-P, at p. 6.) 
Mr. Bernstrom testified that the conveyor system 
was an essential part of the process plants and that the 
design and engineering of the conveyor system was im-
portant to the project time schedule. (Tr. 76, 90-91.) 
McKee admitted in answers (R. 23) to interrogatories 
(R. 13-14), that GSL had not authorized any delay on 
Houben's part in obtaining the bond or notified McKee 
at any time that the bond was no longer required.6 The 
6McKee's answers to questions 20 and 22 in GSL's first set of 
interrogatories. The interrogatories and the answers were received 
in evidence as part of the trial record. (Tr. 106-107, 262-263.) 
7 
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acting head of McKee's purchasing department, Kenneth 
Ferguson, who also served with an assistant as the pur-
chasing agent for the GSL project (Tr. 174, 192, 266), 
testified that he knew the bond was important and was 
to be obtained without delay (Tr. 183). Mr. Ferguson 
had full responsibility for the fifty purchase orders is-
sued by McKee for GSL's project and was accountable 
only to McKee's project manager, Mr. McNeil. (Tr. 181-
182, 191.) Mr. McNeil testified that the purchasing 
agent's duties included following up on purchase orders, 
obtaining insurance certificates7 and bonds. (Tr. 275.) 
Mr. Bernstrom, testifying from his experience in engin-
eering work, explained why a person with Derricott's 
assignment with respect to drawings and the flow of the 
work as directed by McKee's engineers would have no-
thing to do with getting bonds. (Tr. 80-81.) He also 
testified that the purchasing agent or his immediate 
superior would be the person responsible for getting the 
bond. (Tr. 81-82.) 
Despite the urgency for the bond, as expressed in 
McKee's purchase order, Mr. Ferguson testified that he 
waited seven weeks until November 6, 1969, to telephone 
Houben about the bond and learned then that the bond 
had not been obtained. He talked to a Mr. Niepelt of 
Houben who told him that the matter was in hand and 
the bond would be provided shortly. (Tr. 177.) 
On November 18, 1969, Mr. Brinkmann sent a mem-
orandum regarding the bond to Mr. Derricott, who 
passed it on with a memorandum of his own to Mr. Fer~ 
7The reporter typed "tickets*. 
8 
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guson. (Ex. 22-D; Tr. 120, 227.) Mr. Brinkmann testi-
fied that he sent the memorandum for the purpose of 
seeing that the increased cost of Houben's job and the 
work of Houben's subcontractors was covered. (Tr. 49, 
52, 224-226, 236-241.) 
Although Houben's failure to have obtained the 
bond by November 6 was a "red flag" to Mr. Ferguson, 
he waited another 2 weeks until November 20 to tele-
phone Houben again about the bond. This time he sug-
gested the name of a bonding company but took no fur-
ther action. (Tr. 175, 177, 184-185.) 
Afterwards, in a deposition before the trial, Mr. 
Derricott was asked with reference to Mr. Brinkmann's 
memorandum of November 18, whether Mr. Derricott 
believed or knew at that time or afterwards that a bond 
had not been provided because Mr. Brinkmann had made 
no reference in his memorandum to having received a 
copy of the bond. (Tr. 126-128.) Derricott said that he 
"did not know that a bond had not been provided or that 
it had been provided." He also said that it was his as-
sumption or state of mind that a bond had not been pro-
vided. (Tr. 125-127.) At the trial he testified that he 
did not learn that Houben had not obtained a bond until 
construction of the conveyor system was about to com-
mence ne<ar the end of March, 1970. (Tr. I l l , 43.) He 
said he felt there was no conflict with his testimony in 
the deposition, that it was "all assumptions" at the time 
his deposition was being taken and that he doubted that 
the questioin whether Houben had obtained a bond had 
entered his mind in 1969. (Tr. 132-133.) 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Ferguson maintained a "tickle file'7 for import-
ant documents and sent GSL copies of his follow-up 
letters to vendors when such documents were missing. 
(Exs. 53-P, 54-P, 55-P, 56-R) There was no evidence 
that he followed that practice with respect to Houben's 
performance bond. When Mr. Ferguson was asked if 
he had reported the subject to his telephone conversa-
tions with Houben to GSL, he would only say that he 
had no recollection of doing so but "probably" he did 
or that it was a "possibility" that he did. (Tr. 178, 184-
185.) He also acknowledged that Mr. Brinkmann and 
Mr. Derricott could have assumed that there was a bond 
and that "it may not have been unreasonable" for them 
to do so; but "it may have been unwise". (Tr. 188,189.) 
No evidence was offered that Mr. McNeil, who knew that 
Houben did not have the bond (Tr. 276), asked for fur-
ther instructions from GSL in light of Houben's delay. 
Mr. McNeil testified that he did not discuss the bond 
with Houben, but spoke to Mr. Ferguson, about it. (Tr. 
276.) Mr. McNeil and Mr. Ferguson participated with 
counsel for McKee in the preparation of McKee's an-
swers to interrogatories (Tr. 195, 260) where it was ex-
pressly stated that GSL was not told that a bond had 
not been obtained. (Question No. 9 (R. 12) and the 
answer (R. 21).) 
When GSL received Houben's first progress billing 
(Exs. 41-D, 42-D) it was sent on to Mr. McNeil for ap-
proval. The billing was for man hours spent by Houben 
on the project and contained no amount for the bond 
premium. Mr. McNeil approved the billing and testified 
at the trial that there was nothing about the billing to 
eause him concern. (Tr. 275-276.) -.. 
10 
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Mr. Lawrence Parker, a lawyer who had represented 
a bonding company that had bonded a subsidiary of 
Houben, was called as a witness for McKee. He had been 
in the "underwriting aspect"'of the bonding business, 
had represented surety companies and was involved in 
defending them. (Tr. 156, 172.) He testified as to his 
efforts in November 1969 to obtain funds for his client 
from Houben. Mr. Parker telephoned on November 14 
to ask if GSL would honor an assignment by Houben to 
his client, a bonding company, of the money due Houben 
on Houben's first progress billing. He was told that GSL 
would not. (Tr. 162-163.) Then, without telling GSL of 
their "arrangement", Mr. Parker and Houben decided 
that GSL would be asked to forward its payment of the 
progress billing to Houben in care of Mr. Parker's law 
firm and that Houben, without GSL's knowledge, would 
execute an assignment of the funds to Mr. Parker's 
client. (Tr. 164, 172.) Houben's request was received 
in a letter on November 20 (Ex. 29-D) and the payment 
was made as requested on December 1, 1969 (Ex. 36-D). 
Mr. Parker also testified that after October 1969 
and on November 14, when he called GSL, Houben, due 
to financial troubles, could not have obtained a bond. 
(Tr. 168, 172-173.) Mr. Parker did not say that he told 
GSL of Houben's situation. McKee offered no evidence 
that Houben could have obtained a bond after October 
1969. 
Mr. Christensen, GSL's secretary and treasurer, who 
did not know that the McKee purchase order required 
a bond of Houben (Tr. 199, 200), testified that he con-
sidered the possibility that Houben might be in financial 
11 
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difficulty along with other possible reasons for request-
ing that the payment be sent to the law firm (Tr. 203, 
205-206) and authorized the request bemuse of the 
amount involved and because they were beginning on 
the Houben contract (Tr. 211). He testified that there 
were no similar requests as to later progress payments 
and that the later payments were made directly to Hou-
ben. Mr. Leland Irvine, a businessman, who testified as 
an expert witness for GrSL, gave his opinion and stated 
at length the reasons why the telephone call from Parker 
and Houben's request to sent the payment of the first 
progress billing to Houben in care of a law firm would 
not have caused a reasonable businessman to suspect 
that Houben was in financial difficulties. (Tr. 282, 290.) 
GrSL did not tell McKee of Mr. Parker's telephone call 
or of sending the payment of Houben's first progress 
billing in care of the law firm. 
On December 19, 1969, Mr. Brinkmann wrote to Mr. 
McNeil regarding a reduction of McKee's activities 
and stated, among other things, that purchasing and ex-
pediting would be taken over by GrSL on January 2, 
1970. (Ex. 12-P.) On December 29, 1969, Mr. Ferguson 
wrote to Houben saying that responsibility for the pro-
ject would be assumed by GrSL. (Ex. 13-P.) Nothing 
was said to GrSL at that time about the bond. McKee 
continued to perform services for GSL after that time 
under the letter of intent and the unsigned agreement 
which services were the basis of McKee's counterclaim. 
(Ex. 52-D.) 7 
Near the end of March, 1970, as the time for con-
struction of the conveyor system approached, GSL per*-
12 
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sonnel were looking in the Houben file for the certifi-
cates of liability insurance needed for the construction 
work, and found that the file contained neither insurance 
certificates nor the bond. Mr. Brinkmann them tele-
phoned the McKee officers in San Francisco, because he 
thought that McKee would have the bond, and was in-
formed that McKee did not have it. (Tr. 43-45.) GSL 
then turned to Houben (Tr. 111-112; Ex. 26-P), but the 
bond was never obtained (Tr. 22). 
On May 13, 1970, while the construction of the con-
veyor system was underway, Houben notified GSL by 
letter that due to Houben's financial condition, it would 
have to discontinue its construction activities. (Ex. 
14-P.) When McKee declined GSL's request to finish 
Houben's work (Tr. 24), GSL concluded the engineering 
work with some help from McKee (Tr. 23), and con-
tracted with Jelco, Inc., another contractor on the pro-
ject, to complete the construction of the conveyor sys-
tem on the basis of cost plus a fee (Tr. 24). The con-
veyor system was finally completed at a cost to GSL 
of $446,480.25 in excess of the Houben contract price. 
(Tr. 24; Ex. 15-P.) 
McKee did not deny, through the course of the trial, 
that if Houben had obtained the performance bond as 
required, a bonding company would have been obligated 
to GSL in the amount of $300,000.00 for the completion 
of the conveyor system. Both Mr. Ferguson and Mr. 
McNeil testified that the bond, if obtained, would have 
been available to assist GSL when Houben left the job. 
(Tr. 275,183.) 
13 
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McKee did not challenge Jelco's costs in construct-
ing the conveyor system although McKee had opportuni-
ties to do so when it examined Jelco's records before the 
trial. (Tr. 277-279.) Instead, testimony was presented 
through Mr. McNeil that if McKee had learned in No-
vember of Houben's financial troubles, several alterna-
tives would have been available including giving the work 
to McKee (who later refused it) or to one of the other 
earlier bidders for the conveyor system such as Coastal 
Plains. (Tr. 249.) Mr. McNeil testified as to what he 
thought it would have cost to have Houben's work fin-
ished by other contractors that had bid on the conveyor 
system contract. (Tr. 250-258; Ex. 50-D.) 
Although time was of the essence in Houben's work 
(Ex. 11-P, at p. 13) and time had already been lost when 
Coastal Plains declined a contract for the conveyor sys-
tem (Tr. 215), Mr. McNeil's testimony showed that it 
would have taken an additional two to three weeks for 
a new contractor just to obtain needed engineering in-
formation from Houben's office (Tr. 257). His calcula-
tion® did not include the cost to GrSL of any further de-
lays. (Ex. 50-D.) No evidence was offered by McKee 
that the original bidders would have taken over Houben's 
work at their earlier bid prices, that Coastal Plains, Inc. 
would have given the guarantees it had refused to give 
before, and that Houben, who was actively pursuing its 
work under the McKee purchase order, would have 
stepped aside and made its work product and facilities 
available to a new contractor. Mr. McNeil acknowledged 
that no one at McKee had made contact with the earlier 
bidders prior to the trial todetermine whether infact 
14 
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any one of them would have taken over the Houben work 
on the basis of their earlier bids. (Tr. 279-280.) Neither 
Mr. McNeil nor any other witness testified that, all 
things considered, Houben should have been removed 
from the project. 
Mr. Bernstrom, an expert witness for GSL, testified 
that am owner would try very hard to avoid taking a 
contractor off the job. He gave the reasons for his 
opinion based upon his experience, namely the attendant 
delay, even without Houben's opposition, of five to six 
weeks in getting a new contractor on the job, the likeli-
hood of Houben's opposition to removal and its reluct-
ance to turn over its drawings to a new contractor, the 
reluctance of a new contractor to rely upon the work 
product of the old contractor and the probability that a 
new contractor would insist upon more money. (Tr. 
291-294,298-299.) 
Mr. Bernstrom also testified that McKee should 
have seen that the bond was obtained by Houben in not 
more than two weeks. (Tr. 72.) In Mr. Bernstrom's 
opinion, McKee should not have waited until November 
6 to call Houben about the bond. It was very poor prac-
tice to wait until November 22 to call Houben the second 
time. (Tr. 96.) It was Mr. Bernstrom's opinion that 
McKee's performance with respect to the bond was not 
in accordance with the care, skill and diligence of a pro-
fessional engineer. (Tr. 71, 77, 84, 87, 89, 96.) No evi-
dence was offered by McKee to show that it had acted 
properly with respect to the bond. 
15 
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At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court wrote 
a memorandum decision stating that GSL was barred, 
under doctrines of contributory negligence and waiver, 
from recovering against Houben because the trial court 
thought Mr. Derricott knew and Mr. Brinkmann knew 
or should have known of the bond's absence and because 
GSL paid Houben's progress billings when it knew or 
should have known of Houben's financial troubles. (E. 
86.) Findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment 
were requested in accordance with the decision. (B. 88, 
91.) The findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
were entered raise additional issues not raised in the 
trial court's memorandum decision. All of the material 
issue-s raised will be treated in our argument. 
AEGUMENT 
I 
McKEE IS LIABLE TO GSL IN THE 
AMOUNT OF THE PEEFOEMANCE BOND 
WHICH WAS EEQUIBED OF HOUBEN 
A. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent in-
cluded the duty to see that Houben was bonded: — It 
was acknowledged by McKee in its answers to the first 
and third questions in GSL's first interrogatory that 
McKee acted as GSL's agent in the procurement of Hou-
ben's services to provide the conveyor system for GSL. 
(B. 12, 21.) The evidence at the trial shows that this 
agency relationship was founded in contract. The wit-
nesses who testified on the subject, Mr. Andrews for 
GSL and Mr. Hansen and Mr. McNeil for McKee, were 
agreed that the parties considered the Letter of Intent, 
m 
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dated January 9, 1969, together with the unsigned En-
gineering Agreement, to be the equivalent of a contract. 
(Exs. 4-P, 6-P; Tr. 24, 26, 147, 150, 154, 274.) McKee 
billed GSL for its services and was paid for those ser-
vices prior to 1970 pursuant to those instruments. (Tr. 
154.) - ^ 
It was an expressed condition of the contract between 
GSL and McKee that the latter would act as agent for the 
procurement and delivery of all equipment and long lead 
time materials (Ex. 6-P, Par. G, pp. 2-3) as McKee had 
offered to do in its response to GSL's bid (Ex. 1-P). In 
accordance with McKee's representation as to the quality 
of the services offered (Ex. 1-P), the contract, as another 
expressed condition, provided that McKee would per-
form in accordance with the care, skill and diligence of 
a professional engineer (Ex. 6-P, p. 15). 
One of McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent, 
was to purchase a conveyor system for GSL's project 
and another duty was to see that the vendor would be 
bonded. The evidence of these duties is found in McKee's 
undertaking to purchase the conveyor system (Ex. 11-P), 
in Mr. Andrews' order that Houben be bonded (Tr. 104), 
in his and Mr. Brinkmann's assumption this had been 
done (Tr. 243, 43), in McKee's admission in its answer 
to the complaint that a performance bond was required 
of Houben (par. 5 of the Answer, K. 6), in the acknow-
ledgment in McKee's answers to interrogatories that 
GSL did not notify McKee at any time that the bond 
was not required and did not authorize any delay in 
obtaining the bond (B. 13-14, 23), in McKee's direction 
to Houben that McKee be furnished copies of the bond 
17 
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without delay (Ex. 11-P, at p. 5), in McKee^s reserved 
authority to approve the form and the issuer of the bond 
(Ex. 11-P, at p. 16), in Mr. McNeil's follow-up with Mr. 
Ferguson about the bond (Tr. 276), and in Mr. Fergu-
son's subsequent follow-up telephone conversations with 
Houben to get the bond (Tr. 43-44). 
No witness who appeared at the trial on McKee's 
behalf testified that McKee was not responsible to see 
that the bond was obtained by Houben. 
McKee's duty to see that Houben was bonded was as 
much a part of the contract as were the expressed condi-
tions. The principle of law involved is discussed in Selec-
tions from Williston on Contracts, § 1293, as follows: 
"It is not only for breach of express promises 
that a contractor is liable but of implied promises 
as well; and the most serious difficulty in this 
matter is to determine what promises are fairly 
to be implied in a given contract. The principle 
to be adopted, however, is plain; the difficulty 
lies in its application. Since the governing prin-
ciple in the formation of contract is the justifiable 
assumption by one party of a certain intention 
on the part of the other, the undertaking of each 
promisor in a contract must include any promises 
which a reasonable person in the position of the 
promisee would be justified in understanding 
were included. 
"Whenever, therefore, a contract cannot be 
carried out in the way in which it was obviously 
expected that it should be carried out without one 
party or the other performing some act not ex-
pressly promised by him, a promise to do that act 
must be implied." 
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In view of Mr. Andrews' order that the vendor be 
bonded, followed by McKee's express directions to that 
effect in its purchase order issued to Houben, GrSL was 
justified in assuming that McKee intended to see that 
Houben was bonded. A promise on McKee's part to 
see to the bonding of Houben must be implied. Mr. Mc-
Neil's subsequent discussion with Mr. Ferguson about 
the bond and Mr. Ferguson's efforts in his telephone 
conversations with Houben should refute any argument 
that McKee did not undertake to see that Houben was 
bonded. 
B. McKee's duties as GSL'.s procurement agent in-
cluded the duty of prompt action including notice with 
respect to the performance bond required of Houben: 
— When an agency relationship is created there is also 
implied a duty of care by the agent for the principal's 
interest. This duty, fiduciary in character, has been ex-
pressed in Mecham, Outlines of Agency, § 500, in the 
following words: 
"It is the duty of the agent to> conduct him-
self with the utmost loyalty and fidelity to the 
interests of his principal, * * * . 
"When the principal employs an agent, the 
law presumes that he does so in order to secure 
to himself the benefits of the agent's skill, experi-
ence or discretion, and to reap the fruits of the 
performance of the undertaking. The law pre-
sumes that he expects — and it gives him the 
right to expect — that the agent so employed will 
endeavor to further the principal's interests, and 
will use his powers for the principal's benefit; 
# # * y > 
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This duty of care was further explained in this court's 
opinion in State Automobile & Casualty Under, v. Salis-
bury, 27 U.2d 229, 494 P.2d 529, 531-532 (1972), as fol-
lows: 
"It is true that the rights and duties of prin-
cipal and agent inter se are primarily fixed by 
the contract between them. But also to be con-
sidered in connection therewith are the mutual 
responsibilities the parties have to each other 
which are implied from the operation of law ap-
plicable to such relationship. Arising from what 
is commonly known and accepted as to the cus-
toms and experience in the everyday affairs of 
life, the parties each has the right to assume that 
the other will perform the duties he agrees to with 
reasonable care, competence, diligence and good 
faith, even though such terms are not expressly 
spelled out in the contract; and if failure to so 
perform those duties results in damage to the 
other party he is entitled to recover for breach 
of the contractual duties." 
In that case the principal recovered from its agent the 
money paid out under a policy of insurance which was 
issued contrary to the principal's instructions. 
The duty of care includes the duty to act promptly 
and to notify the principal of material facts. This duty 
is discussed in Mecham, Outlines of Agency, § 541, as 
follows: 
" * * * It is the duty of the agent to give the prin-
cipal timely notice of all facts coming to the 
agent's knowledge, relating to the subject matter 
of the agency, which it is material for the prin-
. cipal to know for the protection of his interests, 
and which the agent can and may communicate 
to him. * # * " 
m 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"If he has undertaken to care for, protect or 
represent the principal's property or interests, 
and such property or interests are attacked or 
threatened or imperiled by hostile forces or im-
pending dangers or wrongful acts, it would or-
dinarily be the agent's duty to inform the prin-
cipal, so that he may take such steps as he de-
sires to protect his interests. If the agent finds 
himself unable or unwilling to carry out under-
takings for which the principal depends upon him, 
he should give the principal timely notice, that he 
may make other arrangements. * * * " 
The agent's obligation of prompt action including 
notice to the principal has been recognized in the cases 
where the agent failed to procure insurance for the prin-
cipal's protection. The insurance cases are instructive 
and helpful because they show the application of the 
duty of prompt action and notice in situations where the 
principal's protection through insurance is part of the 
agent's obligation. In the annotation, Duty and Liability 
of Insurance Broker cos Agent to Insured ivith Respect 
to Procurement, Continuance, Terms, and Coverage of 
\nsurance Policies, 29 ALE2d 165, § 9, the principle is 
stated in, the following language (at p. 184): 
"An insurance agent or broker who under-
takes to procure insurance in accordance with in-
structions must motify his principal if he cannot 
obtain the insurance seasonably or upon the terms 
and conditions requested. * * * " 
Again, in 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 175, it is stated 
(footnotes omitted): 
"An agent or broker who undertakes to pro-
cure insurance in accordance with instructions 
impliedly undertakes to give notice to his client 
fcl 
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in the event of his failure to procure such insur-
ance. Unless there is an agreement to the con-
trary, he is bound to act promptly to obtain the 
insurance on the terms and conditions directed, 
and if he cannot obtain the insurance seasonably 
or upon such terms or conditions, he must notify 
his principal of such fact within a reasonable 
time, and if he fails to do so he makes himself 
liable for damages suffered by his client from 
lack of insurance." 
"Where the agent fails to procure insurance 
in accordance with his instructions, the person 
employing him for that purpose is not eontribu-
torily negligent because of not seeking to obtain 
insurance through other means where he has not 
been notified that a policy of insurance has not 
been issued." 
The special urgency for prompt action and notice 
where insurance is involved was expressed by the Uni-
ted States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Coffey v. Polimeni, 188 F.2d 539 (1951), where an in-
surance broker failed to act on an application for fire 
insurance. Counsel for the defendant had argued that 
no action would lie for an agent's delay where there was 
no breach of a legal duty to obtain insurance. The court 
responded to the argument in the following words (188 
F.2d at 542-543 (footnotes omitted): 
"Counsel argue that, assuming negligence, 
the correct rule is that no action will lie against 
an insurance agent for delay in acting on an ap-
plication where no breach of legal duty to obtain 
insurance appears. They concede that this view 
is at variance with the general trend of authority 
and with the great bulk of the decisions dealing 
immediately with the subject. A few commen-
22 
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tators and an occasional judge have critized this 
line of decisions as unorthodox or unsupported 
by reason, but they appear to us to announce a 
salutary rule. The thought they stand for is that 
the agent or company owes the applicant for in-
surance what amounts to a legal obligation to act 
with reasonable promptness on his application, 
either by providing the desired coverage or by 
notifying the applicant of the rejection of the 
risk so that he may not be lulled into a feeling 
of security or put to prejudicial delay in seeking 
protection elsewhere. Implicit in the cases is a 
recognition that these transactions are funda-
mentally unlike ordinary commercial or business 
dealings where mere profit is the stake, so prone 
is the failure of insurance protection to result 
in irretrievable disaster to the individual. Those 
engaged in the insurance business understand 
perfectly the peculiar urgency of the need for 
prompt attention in these matters." 
Although McKee is not engaged in the insurance 
business, as the defendant in the Coffey case was, McKee 
did undertake to protect GSL's interests where insur-
ance was involved. The need for the bond and for 
prompt action in this case was perfectly understood. 
This is evident in the provisions of McKee's purchase 
order calling for the bond to be obtained without delay, 
in McKee's reserved authority to approve the issuer and 
the form of the bond and in Mr. Ferguson's testimony 
that he knew the bond was important and was to be ob-
tained without delay. (Tr. 183.) 
C. GSL was damaged by McKee's failure to act 
promptly and is entitled to recover from McKee the 
amount of the bond: — Both Mr. Ferguson and Mr. 
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McNeil testified that if the bond had been obtained it 
would have been available to assist GrSL when Houben 
left the job. (Tr. 183, 275.) Mr. Bernstrom testified that 
McKee was not justified in waiting seven weeks until 
November 6 and again until November 20 to telephone 
Houben about the bond. (Tr. 72, 77, 84, 87, 89, 96.) 
Mr. Parker, a lawyer experienced with bonding com-
panies and familiar with Houben's circumstances at the 
time, gave his opinion that the opportunity for Houben 
to obtain a bond had passed after October 1969 and, 
when asked by the trial court, stated that this was so on 
November 14, 1969, when he called GrSL about an assign-
ment of funds by Houben for Mr. Parker's client. (Tr. 
168, 172-173.) McKee's personnel, after investigation, 
had concluded that Houben was a "qualified and accept-
able bidder" (Ex. 24-P, part P-3 at p. 3; Tr. 275) and 
gave Houben the contract in the form of McKee's pur-
chase order. No attempt was made at the trial to chal-
lenge Houben^s qualifications for the work. No evidence 
was offered that Houben, if McKee had acted promptly 
in its supervision of its purchase order, could not have 
obtained the required performance bond. Nor was any 
evidence offered to contradict Mr. Parker's testimony 
that after October 1969 it was too late for Houben to 
obtain a bond. 
Under the provisions of a performance bond of the 
kind required of Houben/ GrSL would have been obli-
gated first of all to pay the contract price for the con-
veyor system. Then the surety would have been obli-
8
 An example of the type of bond that should have been obtained 
was received in evidence, without objection, as Ex. 16-P. (Tr. 5.) 
34 
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gated either to complete Houben's contract or to make 
funds available for its completion up to but not exceeding 
the amount of the bond, $300,000.00. And, finally, GSL 
would have had to pay the balance, if any, for the com-
pletion of the work, in this case $146,480.00. Instead, 
since there was no bond, GSL was obligated to pay the 
total of the contract price plus the overrun of $446,480.00. 
(Tr. 24, Ex. 15-P.) GSL's evidence in this respect was 
not contradicted by McKee. 
The measure of damages where the protecton of in-
surance has been lost is expressed in the ALK2d Anno-
tation referred to supra, p. 21, as follows (29 ALR2d, 
§ 29, at p. 203): 
"The measure of the liability of an insurance 
agent or broker for his failure to procure insur-
ance is the amount that would have been due un-
der the insurance policy if it had been obtained." 
In Couch On Insurance, vol. 2d, at § 25:32, the principle 
is stated as follows: 
"An agent or broker who in any respect vio-
lates his duties to the insured is personally liable 
to him for the damages caused by his default, that 
is, for the amount which could have been recover-
ed from the insurer had the proper insurance 
been obtained." 
We submit that McKee's conduct in waiting seven 
weeks to contact Houben about the bond and in failing 
to notify GSL of the delay was a breach of McKee's 
duty as GSL's agent, whether that conduct is judged by 
the standard of reasonableness expressed in State Auto-
mobile & Casualty Under., supra, p. 20, or by the con-
tract's standard — the care, skill and diligence of a 
25 
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professional engineer — which Mr. Bernstrom testified 
McKee failed to meet. (Tr. 77, 81-82, 84, 87, 89, 96.) We 
further submit that the measure of GSL's damage in 
this case, which it is entitled to recover from McKee, 
is the amount of the performance bond. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING THAT GSL IS BARRED BY WAIVER 
OR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR IS 
ESTOPPED FROM RECOVERING FROM 
McKEE 
A defendant who relies upon waiver, contributory 
negligence or estoppel in order to avoid liability as-
sumes a burden of proof which McKee has failed to 
meet. The elements of these defenses are simply not 
present in this case. 
A. GSL did not waive its rights as against McKee 
with respect to the bond: — In this court's opinion in 
Schwab Safe & Loch Co. v. Snow, 47 Ut. 199, 152 Pa^. 
171, 176 (1915), waiver was defined in the following 
language : 
"But what is a "waiver"? It is defined as 
n
 being the " voluntary and intentional relinquish-
ment of a known legal right and implies an elec-
tion to dispense with something of value or forego 
some advantage which the party waiving it might 
at his option, have demanded or insisted upon." 
4 Words and Phrases (2d Ser.) 1226, 1227. A 
. •> waiver may or may not rest in contract. If it 
does, it, like all other contracts, requires some 
consideration. * * * " 
26 
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The Schwab case involved the question whether the de-
fendant had waived its cause of action for defendant's 
failure to deliver goods as contracted. The Court found 
the casual correspondence between the parties insuf-
ficient to establish an intentional relinquishment of a 
known legal right. 
The requirement of consideration referred to in 
the Schwab case, were a waiver of contractual obliga-
tions is alleged, is discussed in Selections from Williston 
on Contracts, § 680, as follows: 
"Either prior to the time for performing a 
contract, or after its breach, the parties may 
agree that one or both of them shall do something 
different from the performance which the origi-
nal contract specified. If the agreement is made 
after breach, it is in accord, and when executed 
it is an accord and satisfaction. The new contract 
may be like the old except for the single particu-
lar of the time of performance. Thus, where, 
after failure to carry out a marriage contract at 
the agreed time, negotiations are begun to ar-
range for a subsequent date, whatever rights may 
have accrued from such failure are thereby dis-
charged. If the new agreement is made when 
there has as yet been no breach of the original 
contract, it is not technically an accord but the 
principles involved are the same, being merely 
those involved in the formation of any contract. 
Whether the agreement is made before or after 
breach, therefore, there must be consideration to 
support it." 
In 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 159, it is 
stated that where substantial rights are involved and in 
the absence of an estoppel, a waiver of rights based upon 
contract requires consideration. 
J? 
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In a later case, Phoenix Insurcmce Co. v. Heath, 90 
Ut. 187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936), an agent was held liable for 
delay in cancelling a policy of insurance. The agent 
had argued that his principal had waived a provision 
in the agency contract by which defendant was required 
to immediately reduce the coverage of a policy of insur-
ance when instructed by plaintiff. The claim of waiver 
was based on the fact that plaintiff had replied to de-
fendant's initial letter seeking a reconsideration of the 
ordered reduction. The Court, in holding there was no 
waiver in the facts of the case, said that waiver is the 
"intentional relinquishment of a known right" and went 
on to stress the importance of a distinct intentional re-
linquishment in the following language (61 R2d at 311): 
u # # # rp0 c o n s t i tute a waiver, there must be an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge 
of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it. 
It must be distinctly made, although it may be 
expressed or implied. * * * " 
From the foregoing decisions, it is clear that before 
a party may be held to have waived its rights with re-
spect to another party, the latter must establish the 
following points with respect to the party against whom 
waiver is claimed: 
1. the party asserting his rights must know of them, 
2. he must have relinquished his rights intention-
ally, 
3. the waiver must have been distinctly made, and 
4. where the rights rest in contract, consideration 
is required. 
m 
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It is also necessary that the party claiming the 
benefits of waiver establish his own position as one who 
understood and accepted the alleged waiver. This point 
is expressed in the following quotation from 28 Am. Jur. 
2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 158 (footnotes omitted): 
"As in other situations, the question whether 
waiver will be found in any particular case de-
pends not upon the secret intention of the party 
against whom it is asserted, but upon the effect 
which his conduct has had upon the other party. 
There is no waiver unless the waiver is so in-
tended by one party and so understood and ac-
cepted by the other. * * * " 
Finally, it is necessary that the party claiming the 
benefits of waiver establish that the alleged waiver was 
timely. This point is discussed in 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estop-
pel and Waiver, § 157 as follows (footnotes omitted): 
"The term 'waiver' implies a choice or an 
election to dispense with something of present 
value or to forego some present advantage. There-
fore, to constitute a waiver, the right or privilege 
claimed to have been waived must generally have 
been in existence at the time of the purported 
Turning to the facts of this case and looking first 
to GrSL's conduct, there is evidence of a distinct express-
ed intent that Houben's work be bonded. First of all, 
(xSL ordered that Houben be bonded. Later, on Novem-
ber 18, 1969, the memoranda of Mr. Brinkmann and 
Mr. Derricott regarding the coverage and amount of the 
bond were sent to McKee. And still later, in March 
1970, Mr. Brinkmann telephoned McKee for the bond. 
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This conduct is entirely inconsistent with the idea that 
GSL was not concerned about the bond or did not look 
to McKee to see that the bond was obtained. There was 
no evidence that GSL ever expressed an intent to waive 
its rights with respect to the bond. 
The trial court evidently thought that an intent on 
GSL's part to waive its rights with respect to the bond 
can be implied from the payment of Houben's progress 
billings. (B . 86-87.) We fail to see any connection be-
tween the payment of a progress billing for services 
rendered and an intentional relinquishment of GSL's 
rights with respect to the bond. The trial court offered 
no explanation of such a connection and none was offered 
by any witness at the trial. If there was a connection it 
surely would have been seen by Mr. McNeil and Mr. 
Ferguson, McKee's project manager and purchasing 
agent, but they saw none. They discussed with each 
other Houben's delay in obtaining the bond and Mr. 
McNeil approved GSL's payment of the progress billing 
while Mr. Ferguson telephoned Houben about the bond. 
(Tr. 175, 177, 184-185, 275-276.) 
The method of disbursing funds to Houben under 
the first progress billing, where the money was sent to 
Houben in care of a law firm, resulted from the un-
disclosed arrangement between Mr. Parker and Houben. 
Again, we are at a loss to see any connection between 
the method of disbursing Houben's funds and a distinct 
intentional relinquishment of GSL's rights with respect 
to the bond. No connection was offered by any witness. 
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So far as any evidence of consideration for GSL's 
waiver of contractual rights against McKee is concerned, 
none was offered. 
Turning to McKee's position, there is no evidence 
that it understood or accepted a waiver by GSL of the 
bond. As we have noted, the evidence is that Mr. Fergu-
son and Mr. McNeil acted as though they thought the 
bond was required. Although both men had the oppor-
tunity to do so at the trial, neither said he thought GSL 
had waived the requirement of the bond or that McKee 
was not accountable for the bond's absence. 
Turning to the time element, the uncontradicted 
evidence is that the payment of Houben's progress bill-
ings occurred after it was no longer possible for Honben 
to be bonded. 
B. The defense of contributory negligence is not 
available to McKee in this case: — In the first place, 
negligence on GSL's part would not relieve McKee of 
liability under GSL's first cause of action for breach of 
McKee's contract with GSL. As stated in Williston On 
Contracts, § 1012 C,at pp. 40-41 (footnotes omitted): 
"One who holds himself out as exercising a 
profession, occupation, or business thereby rep-
resents that he is competent to perform services 
incident to that profession, occupation, or busi-
ness; and is bound to exercise the skill which is 
reasonable in view of that representation. 
. . . "The employee is none the less liable though 
the principal was negligent, for the basis of lia-
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bility is not tort but contract, and the employer 
is under no duty to the employee to be careful 
about his own affairs. * * * " 
Even if GrSL had no cause of action for breach of 
contract and was limited to its second cause of action 
for negligence, its payment of Houben's progress billings 
was not contributory negligence on Gf-SL's part. The ele-
ments of contributory negligence, as set forth in Larson 
v. Evans, 12 U.2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1961), are 
"(1) Negligence for which plaintiff is responsible 
* * *. (2) Causal connection between such negligence 
and the injury complained of. * * *" No evidence was 
offered to show in what way GrSL's payment of Houben's 
progress billings and the continuation of Houben on the 
project was negligent. No evidence was offered of any 
advantage to GrSL from nonpayment of the progress 
billings or from Houben's removal from the project. 
And no evidence was offered of any connection between 
what GrSL did and the injury GrSL sustained by reason 
of McKee's failure to act promptly to see that Houben 
was bonded. 
What GSL did in continuing with Houben on the 
project in 1970 was done in reliance upon McKee's im-
plied promise to act promptly in its supervision of its 
purchase order issued to Houben and, in the absence of 
notice to the contrary, in the belief that the bond had 
been obtained. 
As Professor Prosser has stated in The Law of 
Torts, 4th ed., pp. 416-417, 420, the standard of conduct 
for the plaintiff and the defendant is not the same. The 
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plaintiff can be justified in relying upon the defendant 
to protect him. We have shown (supra, p. 19) that in 
a case such as this one, where a principal employs an 
agent to look after the principal's interests, "the law 
presumes that" the principal "expects — and it gives him 
the right to expect — that the agent so employed will 
endeavor to further the principal's interests, and will 
use his powers to his [the principal's] benefit". The 
point is stated in State Automobile & Casualty Under. 
v. Salisbury, supra, p. 20, in these words, referring to 
the parties in an agency relationship, "each has the 
right to assume that the other will perform the duties 
he agreed to with reasonable care, competence, diligence 
and good faith * * * ." 
Mr. Brinkmann and Mr. Andrews testified that they 
assumed that the bond had been obtained. (Tr. 243, 
44-45.) Clearly it was not negligence for GSL to do what 
the law expected and gave it the right to do in this case. 
It is for this reason that the courts, in insurance cases, 
have held that where there is a total failure to procure 
insurance, the principal, in the absence of notice, is not 
contributorily negligent for failing to obtain other in-
surance. Even in cases where there was a partial failure 
of performance, in that a policy with the wrong terms 
was obtained, it has been held that failure of the insured 
to read the policy was not contributory negligence. See 
the Annotation cited at p. 21, supra, 29 ALR2d at p. 
186. 
As noted above, no evidence was offered of a causal 
connection between what GSL did and the injury sus-
tained by reason of the bond's absence. One of the very 
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risks for which the bond was to have provided protec-
tion — an unbonded vendor with financial problems — 
had become a reality before Mr. Parker's telephone call 
or Houben's letter concerning the method of payment 
was received and before the payment of any of Houben's 
progress billings. 
If the parties had not been ignorant of the circum-
stances which made it impossible for Houben to obtain 
a bond in November and thereafter, all that could then 
have been required of GrSL at that point in time was 
that it act reasonably under the circumstances so as not 
to enhance unduly the financial loss that GSL would 
suffer should Houben fail to complete the conveyor sys-
tem. GrSL could not have been asked to incur risks or to 
sacrifice its substantial right to timely completion of the 
conveyor system by changing contractors in order to 
minimize McKee's liability for failure to see that Hou-
ben obtained the bond. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages at §§ 
30, 32-33. 
No one testified for McKee that in their opinion 
Houben should have been removed from the job and re-
placed by another contractor in November or at any 
later time. The trial court did not find that there would 
have been advantage to GSL in removing Houben from 
the job or in refusing to pay Houben for work performed. 
Such a move is fraught with problems of time and cost, 
as Mr. Bernstrom testified. (Tr. 291-294, 298-299.) In 
his opinion as an expert, and the only witness to testify 
as to what should have been done, the reasonable course 
to pursue would have been the course that was followed 
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by the parties in ignorance of the true situation, namely 
to continue with Houben on the job. 
When Houben left the job, GSL proceeded on the 
most economical basis open to it by completing, with 
McKee's help, the remaining engineering and by employ-
ing, on a cost basis, another contractor which was already 
at the job site, to complete the remaining construction 
work which McKee had refused to do. (Tr. 23-24.) 
C. This is not a case for the application of the doc-
trine of estoppel: — Although the trial court did not 
mention estoppel in its decision, it did state in its con-
clusion of law No. 6 that GSL was estopped from re-
covering from McKee. (R. 92.) We believe that the 
application of the doctrine of estoppel in this case is 
entirely misplaced. Estoppel has to do with preventing 
a party from denying some material fact, as explained 
in Migliaccio v. Davis, 120 Ut. 1, 232 P.2d 195, 198 
(1951): 
" * * * Equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais is 
the principal by which a party who knows or 
should know the truth is absolutely precluded, 
both at law and in equity, from denying or assert-
ing the contrary of, any material fact, which, by 
his words or conduct, affirmative or negative, 
intentionally or through culpable negligence, he 
has induced another, who was excusably ignorant 
of the true facts and who had a right to rely upon 
such words and conduct, to believe and act upon 
them thereby, as a consequence reasonably to be 
anticipated, changing his position in such a way 
that he would suffer injury if such denial or con-
trary assertion were allowed." 
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The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law do not disclose what material fact it thought GrSL 
should be precluded from contradicting. No one testified 
that McKee changed its position to its injury because of 
anything done or said by GrSL. 
n i ;•;;.'• 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 
In challenging the trial court's findings of fact we 
do not ask this court to substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the trial court on issues of fact where the 
evidence is in conflict or where reasonable minds might 
differ in their interpretation of the evidence. We as-
sume the burden of showing error in respect to material 
questions of fact in that (1) the facts as found are with-
out sufficient evidentiary support in the record and (2) 
the trial court failed to find facts for which there was 
credible uncontradicted evidence. Martin v. Martin, 29 
U.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102, 1103 (1973); DeVas v. Noble, 
13 U.2d 133, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (1962); Charlton v. 
Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). 
A. It was error to fail to find that there was a con-
tract of employment between GSL and McKee pursuant 
to which McKee acted as GSL's agent in the procurement 
of the conveyor system for GSL's process plants: — 
Witnesses for both parties testified that the Letter of 
Intent and the unsigned Engineering Agreement were 
considered by the parties as the equivalent of a contract 
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pursuant to which McKee performed as GSL's agent and 
was paid for its services. (Tr. 16, 147, 154, 274). No 
evidence was offered to the contrary. 
B. It was error to fail to find that McKee was the 
contracting party with Houben for the conveyor system 
and had all the powers reserved to McKee m its pur-
chase order including full authority to act in GSL's best 
interest with respect to the bonding of Houben: — See 
the purchase order McKee issued to Houben. (Ex. 11-P.) 
C. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 6 (R. 89)) that 
GSL assumed "the duty or obligation to inquire of Hou-
ben as to the status of the performance bond, to see 
that the bond was procured, to inquire of Houben or 
others as to Houben's ability to provide said perform-
ance bond, or to advise GSL of these matters":—No such 
finding was intimated in the trial court's memorandum 
decision. The finding contradicts the trial court's con-
clusions of law which necessarily presume a duty 
on McKee's part to see that Houben was bonded. 
No witness who testified for McKee ever said that 
GSL assumed such responsibility. The evidence is 
all one way in pointing to McKee as the party with the 
duty as to the bond. The date of GSL's purported as-
sumption to responsibility for the bond is stated in the 
finding to be August 21, 1969. McKee's purchase order, 
issued five weeks later, clearly directed that copies of 
the bond be sent not to GSL but to McKee and reserved 
to McKee approval of the form and the issuer of the 
bond. (Ex. 11-P, at pp. 5, 16.) Mr. Ferguson, who was 
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acting head of McKee ?s purchasing department and over 
all of McKee's jobs, had assigned himself with an as-
sistant to the GSL project. (Tr. 192, 266, 174.) He had 
responsibility for the fifty purchase orders issued by 
McKee and was accountable only to Mr. McNeil, the 
project manager. (Tr. 181-182, 191.) Mr. Ferguson fol-
lowed up on important non-engineering documents from 
vendors (Exs. 53-P, 54-P, 55-P, 56-P) and was the per-
son who telephoned Houben about the bond on November 
6 and again on November 20, 1969, evidently after his 
superior, McNeil, had spoken to him about it (Tr. 175, 
177, 184-185, 276). Mr. McNeil testified that the pur-
chasing agent's duties included following up on bonds 
(Tr. 275) as did Mr. Bernstrom (Tr. 80-81). Mr. McNeil 
also testified that the responsibility and duties of Mc-
Kee on the work that it was doing for GSL's project did 
not change. (Tr. 274.) 
GSL lent its assistance to McKee's engineering de-
partment in the form of Mr. Derricott to act under the 
direction of that department in securing engineering in-
formation from vendors. A meeting was held on August 
200, and a memorandum was made of the meeting by 
McKee to confirm Mr. Derrieott's duties. (Ex. 27-P.) 
The memorandum states that the subject of the meeting 
was the securing of "outstanding engineering informa-
tion that is critical to the project schedule" and that Mr. 
Derricott was to perform expediting as "indicated in 
the minutes of weekly meetings and as supplemented by 
other communications from McKee Engineering." The 
decision of the parties, as expressed in the memorandum, 
was in accord with the testimony of Mr. Andrews and 
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Mr. Brinkmann that GSL had offered the services of 
Mr. Derricott to speed up the process of getting cer-
tified drawings from vendors because there were so 
many vendors and their certified drawings were needed 
by McKee's engineers so that they could tie the pieces 
of equipment to be supplied by vendors into the overall 
design of the project and prepare the construction draw-
ings to be used by the contractor for building purposes. 
(R. 42, 54.) Mr. Derricott's duties were clearly fixed by 
the testimony of Mr. Andrews and Mr. Brinkmann and 
by McKee's memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Derricott's 
testimony and the testimony of Mr. Bernstrom, speak-
ing as an experienced engineer, was to the same effect. 
(Tr. 113, 115-118, 80-81.) McKee offered no witness to 
contradict its memorandum or the testimony of GSL's 
witnesses. No evidence was offered that anyone from 
GSL was ever asked by McKee, in the minutes of weekly 
meetings or otherwise, to follow up on the bond. 
D. It was error to fail to find that had McKee 
acted promptly with respect to the bonding of Houben, 
a bond would have been issued and a surety company 
would have been obligated to GSL, to the extent of 
$300,000.00, for the completion of the conveyor system: 
—McKee had investigated Houben, including its finan-
cial situation, and concluded that it was qualified as a 
bidder for the conveyor system and capable of doing the 
work. (Tr. 275; Ex. 24-P, part P-3 at p. 3.) McKee never 
denied that Houben could have obtained a bond before 
November 1969. Mr. Ferguson and Mr. McNeil both 
testified that a bond, if obtained, would have beeiri avail-
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able to assist GSL. (Tr. 183, 275.) GSL's evidence with 
respect to the bond (Ex. 16-P) went unchallenged. 
E. It was error to fail to find that McKee waited 
revert oight- weeks after its purchase order to Houben was 
issued, at which time Houben no longer could obtain a 
bond to contact Houben the first time about the bond, 
that McKee waited another two weeks to telephone 
Houben a second time and then waited without taking 
further action with respect to the bonding of Houben: 
— See the testimony of Mr. Ferguson. (Tr. 175, 177, 
184485.) 
F. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 8 (B. 90) that 
Mr. Derricott and Mr. Brinkmann knew at all times that 
Houben had not obtained a bond: — There is no evidence 
that Mr. Brinkmann learned of the bond's absence be-
fore he telephoned McKee in March 1970. The only evi-
dence with respect to Mr. Derricott's "knowledge", which 
he denied, is the excerpt from his deposition which was 
read into the record and which was limited by McKee's 
counsel to November 18, 1969, and thereafter. (Tr. 126-
128, 132-133.) Finding No. 8 is contradicted by Finding 
No. 11 which says that GSL was not told until after 
November 20 of the bond's absence. (R. 90.) 
Gr. It was error to fail to find that GSL expressed 
a continued intent that Houben be bonded: — The evi-
dence in this respect is the order that Houben be bonded, 
the memoranda sent to McKee in November 1969 on the 
subject of the amount and coverage of the bond and the 
telephone call to McKee for the bond in March 1970. 
(Tr. 104, 120, 227, 43-44; Ex. 22-D.) 
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H. It was error to find {Fdg. No. 9 (R. 90)) that 
GSL knew or should have known on November 14 of 
Houben's financial difficulties and that Houben "pro-
bably" would not have been able to secure a bond at that 
time: — No one testified to that effect. Mr. Parker's 
testimony shows that when he telephoned GSL on that 
date he said nothing of financial troubles on Houben's 
part. (Tr. 162-163.) Mr. Irvine testified that there was 
nothing in the telephone call to cause a reasonable busi-
ness man to believe that Houben was in trouble. (Tr. 
282-290.) Mr. Parker's opinion as to Houben's ability 
to get a bond on November 14 was not qualified. He did 
not say "probably"; he said Houben could not get a 
bond then. (Tr. 168-169, 172-173.) McKee never called 
anyone to testify that there was any possibility of Hou-
ben's getting a bond on November 14 or afterwards. 
I. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 11, R. 90)) that 
shortly after Mr. Ferguson's telephone calls of Novem-
ber 6 and 20 to Houben, the information was relayed to 
GSL that Houben was still working on the bond and it 
was error to fail to find that McKee did not tell GSL 
that the bond was delayed and did not seek instructions 
of GSL when McKee learned of Houben's delay: — The 
only possible basis in the record for Finding No. 11 is 
Mr. Ferguson's testimony that probably or possibly he 
told someone at GSL of his telephone calls. (Tr. 178, 
184-185.) This testimony doesn't even rise to the level of 
contradicting McKee's sworn answers to interrogatories, 
which were received in evidence (Tr. 106-107, 262-263), 
where it was expressly stated that GSL was not told 
that a bond had not been obtained (Question No. 9 (B. 
12) and the answer (B. 21)). -
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J. It was error to find {Fdg. No. 12 (R. 90)) that 
on November 14, when Mr. Parker telephoned GSL, his 
client then had am assignment from Houben, that he 
ashed GSL to agree to the terms of that assignment and 
that GSL did agree: — This is certainly not Mr. Parker's 
testimony. He testified that there was no assignment 
until after GSL had told him it would not honor an as-
signment and he and Houben had decided upon their 
"arrangement", which they concealed from GSL, for 
getting funds to Parker's client. (Tr. 162-164, 172.) 
K. It was error to find (Fdg. No. 13 (R. 91)) that 
McKee's engineering and procedurement services were 
terminated on January 2,1970: — What was effected on 
that date was a reduction in forces. McKee continued 
to perform engineering and procurement services for 
GSL, in the case of "purchasing" to March 22, and in the 
case of "engineering" to April 19, 1970, as McKee's 
billings to GSL show. (Ex. 52-D at pp. 4 and 6.) 
L. It was error to fail to find that no benefit would 
have accrued to GSL from refusing to pay Houben after 
November 1969 or in removing Houben from the job:— 
Mr. Bernstrom, an experienced engineer, testified at 
length as to the reasons why the parties, if they had 
known of Houben's situation, would not have removed 
Houben from the job. (Tr. 291-294, 298-299.) No attempt 
was made by McKee to contradict this evidence and no 
witness called by McKee said that it would have been to 
GSL's benefit to refuse to pay Houben for services per-
formed or to remove Houben. Clearly, McKee, as the 
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contracting party with Houben and knowing there was 
no bond, thought it appropriate for GSL to pay Houben. 
(Tr.276.) 
We submit that there is not much similarity between 
the case tried to the court below and the case presented in 
the findings of fact. In material respects the findings 
are prejudicial to GSL in that they do not resolve the 
fact issues in accordance with the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment entered by 
the trial court should be reversed and the case remained 
to the trial court with directions to enter judgment for 
GSL on its claim against McKee. Since the evidence is 
not in conflict, so far as the material issues of facts are 
concerned, a retrial of the case is not required. Ralph 
A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n, 94 
Ut. 97, 75 P.2d 669, 681 (1938). 
Respectfully submitted, 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
Claron C. Spencer 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
January 1975 
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